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Abstract
We examine how analysts respond to public information when setting stock recommenda-
tions. We model the determinants of analysts’ recommendation changes following large
stock price movements. We find evidence of an asymmetry following large positive and
negative returns. Following large stock price increases, analysts are equally likely to up-
grade or downgrade. Following large stock price declines, analysts are more likely to
downgrade. This asymmetry exists after accounting for investment banking relationships
and herding behavior. This result suggests recommendation changes are “sticky” in one di-
rection, with analysts reluctant to downgrade. Moreover, this result implies that analysts’
optimistic bias may vary through time.
I. Introduction
In this study, we examine how analysts’ recommendations respond to public
information shocks, using large price changes as a proxy for the shocks (Ryan
and Taffler (2004)). We develop hypotheses about analysts’ responses to public
news based on various assumptions regarding the information analysts possess
and the incentives they face. We then estimate empirical models of recommen-
dation levels, conditioning on the sign of the information shock, to determine
which hypothesis is most consistent with the data. The hypotheses we consider
begin with the assumption that analysts’ recommendations reflect price-to-value
comparisons and a belief that the market is informationally efficient. In the first
hypothesis (H1), analysts are unbiased but have no informational advantage rela-
tive to the market, in which case we predict that, on average, a large stock price
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movement will leave the probability of a change in recommendation level unaf-
fected. In both the second (H2) and third (H3) hypotheses, analysts believe they
have private information relative to the market. However, in H3, analysts may
have conflicts of interest (pressure from their firms) that affect their recommen-
dations.1 Where no conflict of interest exists (H2), we predict that, on average,
analysts will downgrade (upgrade) in response to positive (negative) price shocks;
that is, at least a portion of the analysts’ private information is revealed by the
price movement. Although there is a predicted difference in the direction of the
response, we predict no difference in the magnitude of the response to positive
and negative stock price shocks under H2.
In H3, a conflict of interest may exist if the analyst receives negative private
information. In this case, the analyst would ordinarily prefer to downgrade the
stock to maintain the optimal level of optimism and perceived accuracy, but is
prevented from doing so because of business pressure. A sufficiently large neg-
ative shock may relieve the conflict of interest because the market price reveals
a portion of the analyst’s perceived private information, thereby permitting the
analyst to downgrade. No conflict of interest exists if the analyst believes that she
has positive private information. Thus, if H1 or H2 is correct, then the effect on
recommendation levels will be symmetric following positive and negative infor-
mation shocks, although H1 would also be consistent with no response. In H3,
we predict the possibility of an asymmetric response.
The results demonstrate that analysts respond to large price changes by chang-
ing their recommendations. That is, among the sample of analysts’ recommenda-
tions, the probability of observing a change in the recommendation level is much
higher conditional on a large stock price event in the preceding three days. These
results are not consistent with H1, i.e., with analysts behaving as if they have no
private information. Second, following large stock price increases, analysts are
equally likely to upgrade or downgrade, i.e., on average analysts react as if funda-
mental values and market prices move in tandem. Following large stock price de-
clines, however, analysts are much more likely to downgrade a company’s stock.
The asymmetry is also present when we examine only “interior” recommendation
levels, from which analysts can either upgrade or downgrade securities. The ob-
served asymmetry is consistent with analysts’ recommendations before the public
information shock is attributable, at least in part, to some other force such as pres-
sure from their employers.
The higher probability of recommendation downgrades following large neg-
ative return events also is consistent with the theory of information cascades. In
this case, the negative return event shatters the optimistic consensus (Bikhchan-
dani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)). However, the asymmetry in the analysts’
responses to negative return events cannot be simply attributable to analyst herd-
ing. In particular, the evidence reveals that these negative return events are sig-
nificant determinants of analysts’ recommendation levels even after controlling
for the tendency of analysts to respond following other analysts’ recommendation
changes. Overall, the findings suggest that recommendations are differentially
1Our definition of private information encompasses both the presence of information not known
to the public as well as the ability to interpret documented regularities better than the general public.
Of course, an analyst might believe that he has private information when he does not.
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“sticky”—analysts appear to use large stock price drops to realign their optimal
level of optimism and accuracy.
We also conduct a number of robustness checks on our results. First, an ex-
amination of 20- and 60-day market-adjusted returns commencing immediately
after the three-day price shock event show no systematic evidence of price contin-
uation or reversals. This suggests that the price shock we use as our conditioning
variable does not represent an under or over market reaction. Thus, the asymmetry
does not appear to be a prediction of a correction to an over (under) price reaction.
Second, we re-estimate the probit model on two subsamples to determine if the
asymmetry persists when we control for the presence and nature of the news. The
first subsample comprises the set of recommendations around earnings announce-
ments. We find that, controlling for earnings surprises, downgrades are still more
likely to follow negative price shocks, but upgrades and downgrades are equally
likely to follow positive price shocks. In the second subsample, we identify a
small set of large return events for which we could identify no contemporaneous
news release. The asymmetry persists for this sample as well.
We also find that upgrades are more likely if there is a historical investment
banking relationship between the brokerage firm making the recommendation and
the firm for which the recommendation is issued. Analysts also tend to respond in
the same direction as other analysts who recently changed their recommendations.
However, these results do not explain the asymmetry since their effects are present
in both the positive and negative return samples.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the
related literature. In Section III, we develop our hypotheses. Section IV describes
the nature of the data, the sample selection criterion, and the empirical framework.
The empirical results are presented in Section V. Section VI discusses the impli-
cations of the results. Section VII examines post-event returns, while Section VIII
summarizes the paper.
II. Related Literature
Unlike analysts’ earnings forecasts, which are short-term point estimates, an-
alysts’ recommendations can be considered more analogous to capital budgeting
decisions. For instance, Womack (1996) states that stock recommendations are
akin to an analyst concluding that, “I have analyzed publicly available informa-
tion, and the current stock price is not right” (p. 164). This suggests that analysts
develop explicit (or implicit) valuation models. If the market price is sufficiently
below the true value indicated by the model, the stock is accorded a buy recom-
mendation; when the market price is above the model value, the stock is given a
sell recommendation.
Both academics and practitioners have questioned the view that analysts’
recommendations are simple valuation decisions. First, investment banking re-
lationships can potentially bias analyst recommendations (Lin and McNichols
(1998)). Consistent with this, Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2004) show that
independent research analysts tend to outperform analysts employed by invest-
ment banks, and that a large source of the investment banks’ underperformance is
a reluctance to downgrade stocks that had recently issued equity. Thus, analysts
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have mixed incentives. On the one hand, they want to produce accurate reports
to satisfy investors. On the other hand, they have an incentive to produce positive
reports to generate (or retain) investment banking business from the companies
being evaluated. One indication of these conflicting interests is the well-known
upward bias in the distribution of recommendations documented by Stickel (1995)
and others.2
Second, some empirical research contradicts the view that analyst recom-
mendations are based primarily on fundamental valuation models. Bradshaw
(2004) examines the correlation between analyst recommendations and the ra-
tio of fundamental firm value to market price. Bradshaw calculates fundamental
value by substituting analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts into the residual in-
come version of the discounted cash flow model developed by Ohlson (1995).
Surprisingly, he finds that analysts’ recommendations are more (less) favorable
for stocks with low (high) value relative to price. This finding is the reverse of
what the capital budgeting interpretation predicts. However, Bradshaw’s results
are consistent with the survey work of Block (1999). Based on a survey of ana-
lysts, Block reports extremely low reliance on valuation methods in the formation
of stock recommendations.3 Third, Welch (2000) finds significant evidence of
herding toward the consensus among analysts, which is not related to the accu-
racy of the consensus. Thus, analysts do not tend toward the consensus based on
fundamental information.
Individual case studies point to a possibly complex relation between the ar-
rival of market information and changes in analyst recommendations. For in-
stance, Cornell (2001) finds a puzzling relation between the innovations in mar-
ket value and changes in analyst recommendations. Cornell examines the market
reaction to an apparently minor news announcement by Intel that, nonetheless,
resulted in a 30% drop in the company’s stock price and destroyed $125 billion in
shareholder wealth. Following the news announcement and the subsequent price
drop, many analysts revised their recommendations downward, some by several
rating classifications. Not one analyst increased his or her recommendation. If
analyst recommendations were based on a comparison of value to price, this re-
action implies that all analysts believed that fundamental value fell by more than
the $125 billion drop in market capitalization. However, Cornell argues that there
was not enough information in the news release to justify the observed drop in
price; that is, he argues that the change in fundamental value was less than the
drop in price. As with Bradshaw and Block, Cornell’s conclusion would suggest
that in downgrading the company following the price decrease, Intel analysts did
not rely on present value models.
2Following the collapse of technology stock prices in 2000, the conflict of interest issue became
the focus of intense debate in the financial press (e.g., Tully (2001)) and several lawsuits. This per-
ceived conflict of interest has led to increased scrutiny of analysts’ investment practices by the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission and states’ attorneys general (e.g., see Opdyke (2001) and The New
York Times, May 24, 2002).
3Interestingly, although Bradshaw (2004) finds that fundamental valuation models are not reliable
predictors of analyst recommendations, he does find that heuristic valuation models (such as PEG
ratios) have significant explanatory power, despite the fact that PEG ratios are not better predictors of
future returns than value to price ratios.
1/18/2006-842–JFQA #41:1 Conrad, Cornell, Landsman, and Rountree Page 29
Conrad, Cornell, Landsman, and Rountree 29
To date, there has been little research on the determinants of analysts’ recom-
mendation changes, and this work tends to focus on the relation between earnings
announcements and recommendation changes (e.g., Bradshaw (2004) and Fin-
ger and Landsman (2003)), recommendation changes and subsequent stock re-
turns (e.g., Green (2006) in this issue, Womack (1996), Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische,
and Lee (2004)) or analysts’ herding behavior (e.g., Welch (2000), Hong, Ku-
bik, and Salomon (2000)). In terms of setting recommendation levels, findings
in Hong and Kubik (2003) show that analysts are rewarded for both optimism
and accuracy, which suggests that analysts trade off reputation (which is based on
accuracy) and bias. Presumably, anything that affects the comparison of public
price and private value will cause the analyst to change her recommendation while
maintaining the optimal trade-off. However, if the analyst perceives the market
price as too high relative to her private valuation, she may be reluctant to down-
grade the stock (because of pressure from her company), causing the optimistic
bias inherent in her recommendation to become larger. That is, there could be
a dynamic component to the trade-off between accuracy and optimism. In this
example, the dynamic component depends on the sign of the difference between
her private valuation and market price. As market prices change in response to
positive and negative information shocks, the analyst may change her recommen-
dation to reflect a new optimal optimism/accuracy trade-off.
III. Hypotheses
In the first hypothesis, H1, we consider the possibility that analysts do not be-
lieve that they have private information and, consequently, make no value-to-price
comparisons when setting recommendations.4 In this setting, a sharp change in
stock price can neither reflect analyst private information nor have any systematic
effect on analysts’ recommendations.
In the second and third hypotheses, H2 and H3, we assume that analysts be-
lieve that they have private information and use value-to-price comparisons when
setting recommendations. Following Hong and Kubik (2003), we also assume
that analysts are rewarded based on accuracy and optimism. As a result, analysts
set recommendations in a way that reflects an optimal trade-off between those two
competing objectives. In H2, we assume that observed stock price changes are the
result of revelation of at least a portion of analysts’ perceived private information.
As a consequence, when a portion of an analyst’s private information is revealed,
she may reset the recommendation to reflect the new value-to-price comparison.
Under this hypothesis, therefore, we expect to see a downgrade following a price
increase, and an upgrade following a price decrease. In addition, under H2, we
assume that the well known (Stickel (1995)) recommendation bias is time invari-
4In the absence of private information, recommendations may serve the purpose of generating
goodwill among the firm’s clients and potentially investment banking business from the covered firms.
For example, The Wall Street Journal quoted Mary Meeker (an analyst at Morgan Stanley Dean Witter)
as saying “my highest and best use is to help MSDW win the best Internet IPO mandates . . . and then
to let them work their way through our powerful research and distribution system.”
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ant. As a result, the magnitude of the effect on recommendation levels should be
symmetric in the sign of the price shock.5
In H3, we assume that the optimistic bias in analysts’ recommendations can
change through time. In particular, because of conflicts of interest arising from
pressure from the analyst’s employer, the optimistic bias may be more severe
when the analyst believes that she has negative private information. In this case,
the private information of the analyst and the subsequent value-to-price compari-
son suggests that she downgrade the stock, but she cannot. That is, the optimistic
bias has become larger—in fact, unacceptably so in the absence of the conflict of
interest. This hypothesis is consistent with the empirical evidence presented in
Welch (2000), which shows that herding is more pronounced in up-markets. As
a consequence, up-markets may be less efficient at collecting information (e.g.,
Houston, James, and Karceski (2006) in this issue) and consequently may be
more fragile—information shocks in such a market may have a larger impact. If
enough of the analyst’s perceived private information is revealed so as to result in
a sufficiently large negative stock price revision, this may relieve the conflict of
interest with no requirement of action on the analyst’s part. If not, then the frag-
ile consensus may be broken, and the analysts will be more likely to downgrade
following a price decline.
When the analyst believes that she has positive private information, the sub-
sequent value-to-price comparison suggests that she upgrade the stock, and be-
cause there is no conflict of interest, she is free to do so. Thus, as in H2, when the
analyst’s private information is subsequently revealed, causing a positive stock
price revision, the analyst will either take no action if her information is incom-
pletely revealed or downgrade if it is fully revealed. Thus, relative to H1 and H2,
H3 is the only one that predicts the possibility of an asymmetric response on the
part of analysts in terms of changing recommendations following negative and
positive stock price events. The asymmetry is attributable to a stickiness in the
downgrades that is the result of a conflict of interest.
IV. Sample Selection and Research Design
A. Construction of Sample
Construction of the sample begins with the IBES U.S. Recommendations
database, which spans the years 1993–2000. 6 Each observation in the database
represents the issuance of a recommendation by a particular brokerage firm for
5Stock price change events do not necessarily comprise the full extent of analysts’ private in-
formation. Only if the price movement is sufficiently large will it cause the analyst to change her
recommendation.
6We considered the use of changes in analysts’ target prices rather recommendations as our de-
pendent variable. For our sample, we examined the relation between changes in analysts’ recommen-
dation and percentage changes in corresponding target prices in the interval ±15 days surrounding the
recommendation change. Untabulated findings indicate a strongly positive and significant correlation
(0.37) between the two. However, the use of target prices would require a minimum of two adjust-
ments: horizon and required return. Analyst reports provide little information on either dimension.
Moreover, in our sample, there are many cases where analysts simultaneously upgrade (downgrade)
and decrease (increase) target prices. Consequently, we use analyst recommendations as the indicator
of analyst sentiment regarding a stock’s valuation.
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a specific company. For instance, one observation would be a recommendation
by Merrill Lynch regarding Intel. Therefore, there is no distinction in this sam-
ple between “analyst” recommendations and “brokerage firm” recommendations.
Recommendations in the IBES database are coded as follows: 1 = strong buy, 2 =
buy, 3 = hold, 4 = sell, 5 = strong sell. It should be noted that the individual ana-
lyst responsible for the Merrill Lynch recommendation may change over time. If
that is the case, and if the new Merrill Lynch analyst has a different recommenda-
tion, the result would be coded as a change in the Merrill Lynch recommendation.
There are a total of 234,159 observations in the IBES file. Of these observations,
90,777 represent initializations in the data set.7
For each available broker-firm combination, daily recommendations are con-
structed from the IBES dataset. Recommendations can be upgraded, downgraded,
affirmed (i.e., confirmation of prior recommendations), or remain unchanged. Un-
changed recommendations, which represent the overwhelming majority of the ob-
servations, are constructed by “filling in the holes” between each of the 234,159
brokerage recommendations listed on the IBES database. That is, if there is no
new information from a given brokerage on a given day for a given firm, the rec-
ommendation is assumed to remain unchanged.
Because the focus of this study is to determine how individual analysts re-
spond to public information, we require a proxy for information that can be ap-
plied to a large sample of stocks without having to identify any particular infor-
mation event. We choose price movements as a sufficient statistic for information
events. The linkage that we presume between large stock price movements and
information events is supported by evidence presented in Ryan and Taffler (2004)
who find that 65% of price changes can be accounted for by the release of public
information. For computational reasons, we select a subsample of firms for which
there is some evidence of a significant news shock, i.e., a large price shock, during
the sample period.8
We begin by determining for each firm in the recommendations database the
beginning and end dates for which the firm is followed by at least one broker-
age firm. Using these dates to define the time period for the firm, we construct
a vector of returns for this period, beginning immediately before the start of the
recommendations in the database. The vector is based on three-day compounded
returns on the grounds that some information events may affect the market for
more than one day. To illustrate how the vector of three-day returns is computed,
consider a hypothetical firm, XYZ, Inc., which first appears in the recommenda-
tions database on July 11, 1996, and remains in the database until the end of 2000.
The first three-day return for this firm is constructed from July 8 through July 10,
the second is from July 9 through July 11, until the last return from December 28
7Initializations may not actually represent when coverage by the particular broker began, but in-
stead may only represent the first observation for the particular broker/firm combination in the data
set.
8An alternative method of capturing news shocks is to use actual information releases, estimated
from the unexpected components of the information released, and examine analysts’ behavior around
those dates. However, this requires a robust and feasible method of identifying important announce-
ments ex ante, and measuring the unexpected components of those announcements ex post; this would
obviously also entail measurement problems. In Section VII.B, we use a subsample of earnings an-
nouncements for which we can measure the unexpected component of the announcement.
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through December 30, 2000. The next step is to select an appropriate sample of
extreme returns. Here an extreme return is defined as one in the top or bottom
1% tail of the distribution of all firms’ three-day returns subject to two adjust-
ments. First, each three-day return, rit, is netted against the contemporaneous
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) three-day value-weighted market
return, rmt. Second, to control for differences in sample firms’ return volatilities
along with possible changes in volatilities over time, each resulting net-of-market
return, rit − rmt, is scaled by the standard deviation of three-day net-of-market
returns, σit(rit− rmt), calculated using a sample of non-overlapping three-day net-
of-market returns prior to day t, i.e., those running from day −3 to day −249
relative to each day’s return. A vector of market-adjusted returns, ADJRET3 it, is
computed simply as the ratio [rit − rmt]/σit(rit − rmt).
It is this sample of market-adjusted returns that is utilized to calculate upper
and lower 1% tail cutoff points of the distribution of normalized three-day returns
aggregated across all firms. By assumption, any firm exhibiting a stock return
that falls outside these cutoffs has experienced a significant public information
event in relation to both its own performance and the sample as a whole. When
calculating the cutoff points, only non-overlapping returns are used. The resulting
upper and lower 1% cutoff points for the ADJRET3it distribution are −2.59 and
3.06.
We select the final sample of extreme 1% return events for each firm by com-
paring the full vector of market-adjusted three-day returns to the cutoff points
calculated from the overall sample. We avoid selecting overlapping returns as
extreme events. That is, once a three-day period is flagged as an extreme return
event, we do not select the next two (overlapping) three-day return events as ex-
treme. For example, suppose the first three-day return for XYZ that meets one
of these criteria is July 15, 1996. The three-day returns ending on July 16 and
17 would be deleted from the dataset and we would continue chronologically be-
ginning on July 18 to search for the next return observation that meets the cutoff
criteria.
This procedure, which is repeated for each firm in the IBES sample, results
in 40,458 and 41,481 return events, respectively, in the lower and upper 1% tails.
The larger number of return events in the upper 1% tail reflects the fact that lower
tail events are associated with more overlapping returns that are eliminated when
the samples are constructed.9
In our analysis, we measure the marginal effect of large price events on an-
alyst recommendation levels. Consequently, we require a benchmark sample that
includes periods in which no large price event occurs, in order to construct the
unconditional probability of moving from one recommendation level to another.
9For a random sample of 500 large return events, we searched for news releases surrounding each
event to understand better the potential source of the price movement. Not surprisingly, many large
price movements occur close to announcements regarding earnings or preliminary earnings news. For
some large return events, we could find no proximate announcement. We find little evidence that a
single type of announcement is associated with our return events; we examine earnings announcements
separately in Section VII. Overall, the random sample provides strong evidence that these return
events are generally associated with “news.” Furthermore, recommendation changes are five times
more likely to occur after identifiable news events relative to unidentifiable ones, which suggests that
our research design is biased against finding results.
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Thus, our sample period for these 81,939 return events extends from 20 days
prior to the return event to 20 days after the return event, centered on day +1 rel-
ative to the last day of the 1% three-day return event. 10 The additional days add
cross-sectional variation in returns without which the power of our tests would
be limited. That is, if we limit sample observations to include only large stock
returns then the effect of returns on recommendation changes would be estimated
with less precision.11
For our sample of firms with identified public information events, and for
each day in the 41-day event window, we analyze how recommendation levels,
and the probability of changing recommendations, are related to variables that are
publicly available as of the previous day. As described in Section III.C, we use
an ordered probit analysis of recommendation levels that allows for discreteness
in individual analysts’ recommendations and also yields a matrix of transition
probabilities across recommendation levels.
B. Univariate Analysis
Table 1, Panels A and B, provides a variety of descriptive statistics for the
sample. The first column in Panel A presents data for the full sample of IBES
analysts’ recommendations (All Firms), after filling in daily recommendations
between discrete observations in the IBES database. The second column presents
analogous data for the sample of recommendation changes on the day follow-
ing a large return event (1% Sample), where the large return event is defined
as in Section IV.A. The last column presents recommendation change data for
the 9,050,560 recommendation/days used in the probit analysis (Probit Sample).
These are constructed using the 40 days surrounding the large return event in
the 1% sample. The results in Panel A indicate that all samples are dominated
by no changes. For example, among the probit sample, there are 9,000,482 no
change observations. For this same sample, downgrades occur more frequently
than upgrades (24,581 versus 17,610) and, because recommendation changes are
undefined for initializations, there are no initializations in the sample.
Panel B, which breaks down the recommendation changes by number of
grades for the 1% and probit samples, indicates that among downgrades, rec-
ommendation changes of multiple grades are approximately twice as common
as they are among upgrades. The fact that downgrades are more common than
upgrades, particularly for multiple grade changes, is consistent with the positive
bias in the level of recommendations mentioned earlier. In our sample, the aver-
age recommendation is 2.1, which is approximately a buy. The fact that the level
of recommendations already clusters at the optimistic end of the range provides
10Because large return events sometimes occur within 40 days of one another, our procedure of
including observations for the probit analysis in the period ±20 days surrounding each identified
public information event results in duplicate observations for certain firm/broker/date combinations.
To avoid counting these dates multiple times, we remove duplicate entries, leaving a single observation
for each firm/broker combination on any individual day. No large price event is excluded from the
sample with this filter.
11We also estimated our probit analyses using all days in each sample quarter in which the large
return event occurs. Untabulated results from these analyses yield similar inferences to those presented
in the paper. In addition, our tests are robust to a 2% or 0.5% large return threshold and are not
influenced by including only pre- or post-event returns in the analysis.
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TABLE 1
Recommendation Change Descriptive Statistics
Panel A. Recommendation Changes and Levels
All 1% Probit
Firms Sample Sample
Upgrades 53,956 1,158 17,610
Downgrades 63,377 2,449 24,581
Initializations 90,777 0 0
Affirmations 26,049 361 7,887
No changes 28,955,675 210,116 9,000,482
Total obs. 29,223,438 214,084 9,050,560
Strong buy 8,692,627 63,126 2,662,387
Buy 10,889,443 79,581 3,361,314
Hold 8,892,068 66,315 2,810,472
Sell 374,359 2,568 109,960
Strong sell 374,941 2,494 106,427
Panel B. Recommendation Changes by Category
1% Sample Probit Sample
Rec Change Frequency % of Total Frequency % of Total
Upgrade +1 874 0.41% 12,918 0.14%
Upgrade +2 268 0.13% 4,446 0.05%
Upgrade +3 11 0.01% 131 0.00%
Upgrade +4 5 0.00% 115 0.00%
Downgrade−1 1,647 0.77% 16,864 0.19%
Downgrade−2 760 0.36% 7,263 0.08%
Downgrade−3 28 0.01% 259 0.00%
Downgrade−4 14 0.01% 195 0.00%
No changes 210,116 98.15% 9,000,482 99.45%
Panels A and B of Table 1 document the frequency of recommendations across different subsamples and categories. All
recommendations are between 1 (strong buy) and 5 (strong sell). The All Firms sample represents the total number of
observations after filling in the days between IBES recommendation dates as No Changes. The 1% Sample represents
recommendation changes on the day following a standardized CRSP three-day market-adjusted return within the 1% tails
of the distribution for sample firms. The Probit Sample includes the±20 days surrounding event dates identified in the 1%
Sample. Rec Change represents the corresponding recommendation change that occurs the day after the corresponding
three-day return ends. % of Total in Panel B is relative to the total number of observations in the 1% Sample or the Probit
Sample.
less room for future upgrades, particularly by more than one rating category. In
the probit analysis, we estimate separate regressions for each recommendation
level to take account of this congestion at the high end.
Panel B also demonstrates that analyst activity is much greater following
large return events. For example, for the 1% sample, the frequency of upgrades
is higher by a factor of 3 and the frequency of downgrades is higher by a factor
of 4 when compared with the probit sample. The fact that there are relatively few
changes in the recommendations but analysts are more likely to change recom-
mendations following the large stock price events suggests that analysts believe
that they have private information. This finding is inconsistent with H1. That is,
analysts’ recommendations appear to be based on value-to-price comparisons; a
change in the market price may cause a change in their value-to-price comparison
and hence a related change in their recommendations.
If analysts’ recommendations are upwardly biased (Stickel (1995)), then the
arrival of negative information may precipitate a greater response from analysts
than good news. That is, there may be some circumstances in which accuracy is
deemed more important than optimism, just as Hong and Kubik (2003) find that
there are some analysts for whom optimism may be more important than accu-
racy. The findings in Table 1, which indicate a larger proportion of downgrades
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relative to upgrades, could be indicative of such an asymmetric response. The
most direct way to assess the empirical validity of this conjecture is to split the
sample based on the sign of the information shock. Table 2 partitions the 1% sam-
ple in Panel A and the probit sample in Panel B, based on the sign of the three-day
standardized market-adjusted return event. It also includes summary statistics for
the return. Table 2 indicates that the proportion of upgrades and downgrades (for
all numbers of grades) associated with positive and negative return events dif-
fers dramatically. For example, Panel A reveals that whereas there are relatively
equal numbers of upgrades and downgrades following positive returns (612 ver-
sus 567) there are more than three times the number of downgrades than upgrades
following negative returns (1,882 versus 546). Panel B reveals a similar pattern
of upgrades and downgrades in the 40-day window surrounding the large return
events for the probit sample. The accompanying return information suggests that
this asymmetrical analyst response cannot be explained by differences in return
magnitudes preceding the response. The mean and median returns in the positive
and negative return subsamples are not substantially different.
TABLE 2
Recommendation Change and Return Descriptive Statistics Based on Sign of Standardized
Market-Adjusted Return
Return No. of Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Sign Grade Obs. Return Return Return Return
Panel A. 1% Sample
Negative Upgrade 546 −3.60 −3.19 −2.59 −10.45
Negative Downgrade 1,882 −4.42 −3.73 −2.59 −19.86
Negative Affirm 229 −3.79 −3.17 −2.59 −11.65
Negative No change 111,292 −3.25 −2.97 −2.58 −19.86
Positive Upgrade 612 4.23 3.74 16.66 3.06
Positive Downgrade 567 5.35 4.10 43.61 3.07
Positive Affirm 132 4.05 3.69 11.52 3.09
Positive No change 98,824 3.78 3.51 76.98 3.06
Total obs. 214,084
Panel B. Probit Sample
Negative Upgrade 8,311 −0.44 −0.25 13.83 −13.92
Negative Downgrade 16,252 −1.18 −0.67 40.42 −19.86
Negative Affirm 4,208 −0.50 −0.29 7.24 −12.19
Negative No change 4,794,823 −0.23 −0.18 41.93 −23.14
Positive Upgrade 9,299 0.70 0.38 20.45 −11.16
Positive Downgrade 8,329 0.67 0.17 43.61 −18.19
Positive Affirm 3,679 0.34 0.11 27.39 −6.99
Positive No change 4,205,659 0.21 0.03 175.10 −23.04
Total obs. 9,050,560
Panel A of Table 2 documents standardized CRSP three-day market-adjusted return descriptive statistics for firms within
the 1% tails of the return distribution for sample firms. Standardized returns are calculated utilizing three-day market-
adjusted returns scaled by the standard deviation of three-day market-adjusted returns over day−3 to−249. The Return
Sign is designated as positive (negative) if the preceding three-day return was greater than or equal to (less than) zero.
Grade represents the recommendation change occurring on the day following the final day of the standardized three-
day return. Panel B documents the corresponding statistics in Panel A for the Probit Sample, which includes ±20 days
surrounding event dates identified in the 1% Sample.
In Table 3, we present a transition matrix of the probability of moving from
one recommendation level to another, for the 1% sample and the probit samples.
This analysis extends the analysis in Tables 1 and 2 to include information about
the analysts’ initial recommendation level. Panels A and B present evidence for
negative and positive return shocks. Using the probabilities in each transition
matrix, we compute and report an average daily recommendation change, which
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is calculated by multiplying the indicated probability by the corresponding rec-
ommendation change and summing across all possible recommendation change
categories where upgrades (downgrades) are recorded as negative (positive) num-
bers.
TABLE 3
Recommendation Change Probability Matrices
1% Sample Transition Matrix Probit Sample Transition Matrix
New Recommendation New Recommendation
Panel A. Negative Returns
LREC 1 2 3 4 5 LREC 1 2 3 4 5
1 97.17% 1.34% 1.44% 0.03% 0.02% 1 99.39% 0.31% 0.30% 0.01% 0.01%
2 0.55% 97.54% 1.82% 0.06% 0.02% 2 0.16% 99.48% 0.35% 0.01% 0.00%
3 0.30% 0.50% 98.91% 0.16% 0.14% 3 0.12% 0.20% 99.62% 0.03% 0.03%
4 0.07% 0.07% 1.04% 98.81% 0.00% 4 0.04% 0.13% 0.47% 99.32% 0.04%
5 0.14% 0.22% 0.87% 0.07% 98.70% 5 0.09% 0.07% 0.52% 0.04% 99.28%
Avg. recommendation change 0.016 Avg. recommendation change 0.002
Panel B. Positive Returns
LREC 1 2 3 4 5 LREC 1 2 3 4 5
1 99.02% 0.39% 0.55% 0.01% 0.03% 1 99.63% 0.19% 0.16% 0.00% 0.01%
2 0.46% 98.89% 0.61% 0.02% 0.01% 2 0.19% 99.60% 0.21% 0.00% 0.00%
3 0.40% 0.81% 98.65% 0.05% 0.09% 3 0.15% 0.26% 99.55% 0.02% 0.02%
4 0.24% 0.57% 1.62% 97.58% 0.00% 4 0.06% 0.13% 0.58% 99.21% 0.02%
5 0.27% 0.36% 1.69% 0.09% 97.59% 5 0.12% 0.08% 0.60% 0.03% 99.16%
Avg. recommendation change 0.000 Avg. recommendation change 0.000
Table 3 presents frequency percentages of movements in recommendations within both the 1% and Probit Samples. LREC
is the recommendation level on the day prior to the recommendation change (i.e., the lagged recommendation) where
1 represents strong buy and 5 represents strong sell. The 1% and Probit Sample Transition Matrices are calculated by
dividing the frequencies in each cell by the summation of all the frequencies in a given row (i.e., the probability for LREC=1
and New Recommendation = 1 is calculated by taking the number of times this occurs in the sample and dividing by
the total number of times LREC = 1). Average Recommendation changes are calculated by multiplying the indicated
probability by the corresponding recommendation change and summing across all possible recommendation change
categories where upgrades (downgrades) are recorded as negative (positive) numbers. The changes are weighted by
the total number of observations in their corresponding LREC level relative to the total number of observations for the
respective sample.
Comparing the two matrices in the 1% sample (the two left-hand side matri-
ces in Table 3), the asymmetry in analyst response is apparent in this univariate
analysis. The average daily recommendation change following a large negative re-
turn is 0.016, indicating a downgrade. Following a large positive return, the aver-
age daily recommendation change is 0.000. 12 This difference in analyst response
across positive and negative returns is consistent with the evidence presented in
Boni and Womack (2006) in this issue and suggests that the multivariate analysis
should be conducted separately for positive and negative return observations.
Comparison of the two right-hand side matrices in Table 3 that relate to the
probit sample shows virtually no asymmetry and, indeed, little indication of any
recommendation change by analysts when the sample is extended to include days
other than those immediately following the large return event. This is not surpris-
ing as it indicates that the unconditional probability of an analyst recommendation
change is essentially zero.
12We thank Ivo Welch (the referee) for suggesting the transition matrix analysis.
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C. Multivariate Analysis
Recommendations are coded into five discrete categories. This feature of the
data suggests the use of ordered probit analysis, with recommendation levels as
the dependent variable and stock price movements as the key independent vari-
able. Because recommendation levels are presumably affected by other variables,
we include additional independent variables as controls.
In particular, we seek to explain recommendations made by specific analysts
in the 40 trading days surrounding the large return event, i.e., in the 1% upper and
lower return tails. The values of recommendation levels, REC, are limited depen-
dent variables, in that the true recommendation levels, REC ∗, are unobservable.
Under the assumption of a standardized unit normal distributed error term, i.e.,
ε ∼ N(0, 1), ordered probit can be used to estimate the underlying latent relation,
REC∗ = β′X + ε.(1)
We use maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the vector of model parame-
ters, β, which represent the marginal effects of changes in regressors, X, on the
probabilities, Prob(REC = k), k = 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. In addition, cutoff points µ κ,
are imputed where
REC = 1 if REC∗ ≤ µ0(2)
= 2 if µ0 < REC∗ ≤ µ1
= 3 if µ1 < REC∗ ≤ µ2
= 4 if µ2 < REC∗ ≤ µ3
= 5 if µ3 < REC∗.
Note that except for the endpoints, k = 1 and k = 5, the signs of the changes in
probabilities as a function of changes in the regressors are ambiguous. However,
partial derivatives for Prob(REC = k) with respect to each of the regressors eval-
uated at sample means can be computed using estimated model parameters (see
Green (1997), pp. 926–931, for a more complete description of ordered probit).
For example, for a particular continuous variable, X j, we can compute the change
in Prob(REC = k) from Xj = ¯Xj + σj to Xj = ¯Xj − σj, holding all other variables
constant at their sample means. For a particular discrete 0/1 variable, X j, we can
compute the difference in Prob(REC = k) for Xj = 1 and Xj = 0, again holding
all other variables constant at their sample means. At a practical level, because
our sample is dominated by no change observations, the computed changes are all
going to be relatively small. In unreported analyses, we note that these probability
ratios vary monotonically across the recommendation level categories, therefore
we can interpret the sign of the coefficient as having the same influence on the
dependent variable as in an ordinary regression.
The ordered probit model used here is given by (3). Observations are time-
indexed from day−20 to day +20, where day 0 is the day following the end of the
extreme 1% three-day return event that caused a firm to be included in the sample.
The recommendation level on day t, for firm i by brokerage firm j, is denoted by
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the variable RECijt. We estimate the ordered probit separately for each initial
recommendation level.
RECijt = α0 + α1ADJRET3it + α2NEGRETit(3)
+ α3NEGRETij ∗ ADJRET3it + α4ADJRET10it + α5AFILij
+ α6AFILij ∗ ADJRET3it + α7AFILij ∗ ADJRET10it
+ α8LMNREC3it + α9LMNREC10it + α10NUMRECit
+ α11LPERC3it + α12LPERC10it + α13AGEi
+ α14MVEit + α15PRICEit + α16SMALLit
+ α17SMALLi ∗ ADJRET3it + εijt, where
RECijt = recommendation level for firm i by analyst j on day t, t =
−20, . . . , +20;
ADJRET3it = standardized market-adjusted return for firm i for the three
days preceding analyst j’s recommendation change at day t;
NEGRETit = one if ADJRET3it < 0 and zero otherwise;
ADJRET10it = standardized market-adjusted return for firm i for the 10 days
commencing 13 days before and ending four days before an-
alyst j’s recommendation change at day t;
AFILij = one if analyst j’s firm has an investment banking relationship
with firm i as of day t, and zero otherwise;
LMNREC3it = mean recommendation change for firm i for the three days
preceding analyst j’s recommendation change at day t; calcu-
lated as mean recommendation level at day t − 1 less mean
recommendation level at day t − 4.
LMNREC10it = mean recommendation change for firm i for the 10 days com-
mencing 13 days before and ending four days before analyst
j’s recommendation change at day t; calculated as mean rec-
ommendation level at day t − 4 less mean recommendation
level at day t − 13.
NUMRECit = number of analysts following firm i at time t;
LPERC3it = percentage of analysts following firm i at time t that change
their recommendation during the three days preceding analyst
j’s recommendation change at day t;
LPERC10it = percentage of analysts following firm i at time t that change
their recommendation during the 10 days commencing 13
days before and ending four days before analyst j’s recom-
mendation change at day t;
AGEi = number of years between current year and year firm i first ap-
pears on CRSP;
MVEit = equity market value (in thousands) on day t for firm i;
PRICEit = stock price for firm i on day t; and
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SMALLi = one if firm is in the smallest equity market value decile for all
sample observations within the quarter in which day t falls,
and zero otherwise.
The primary empirical question of this study is whether analysts exhibit a
greater tendency to change their recommendations in response to major news,
with large stock price events serving as our proxy for news shocks. Our purpose
for expanding the event window to ±20 days surrounding the end of the 1% tail
three-day return interval is to estimate more accurately the probability of moving
from one recommendation level to another by including “non-event” days sur-
rounding the large return event days. 13 By construction, because the return inter-
val associated with ADJRET3 ends before RECijt is observed, ADJRET3 should
not be affected by REC. However, to allow for the possibility that events prior
to the immediate three days could affect the analyst recommendation level, we
include an additional explanatory variable, ADJRET10, which extends the return
event interval back an additional 10 days.
To determine whether investment banking relationships can possibly affect
the analyst recommendation level, we include AFIL, an indicator variable that
equals one if the analyst’s firm has an investment banking affiliation and zero
otherwise.14 To allow for the possibility that affiliation affects the probability of
the analyst changing his recommendation in response to stock price movements,
we also include the interaction of AFIL with ADJRET3 and ADJRET10. Because
the probability of an analyst responding to large returns may be greater for small
firms, we also allow both the intercept and the return response to vary with the
market capitalization of the firm by including an indicator variable, SMALL, if a
firm is in the smallest size decile, as well as a variable interacting SMALL with
ADJRET3.
It is possible that analysts’ recommendations reflect not just the return event
but also actions taken by their peers following the same stock during the same
three-day period. The tendency of analysts to alter their recommendations in
response to recent actions taken by their peers would occur if analysts have a ten-
dency to “herd” (e.g., Welch (2000)). To test for this, we include LMNREC3 and
LPERC3, which are the mean recommendation change for firm i and percentage
of analysts following firm i that change their forecasts in the three days preceding
analyst j’s recommendation change on day t. As with the return variables, to allow
for the possibility that events prior to the immediate three days could affect the
recommendation level, we include additional explanatory variables, LMNREC10
and LPERC10, which extends the event interval back an additional 10 days.
We include several variables that capture the amount of public information,
interest, or following that a firm might have. First, we include NUMREC, the
13Note we may also be including in our non-event period large return event days that were excluded
in the construction of the sample to avoid overlapping returns. If return events are important in de-
termining analysts’ recommendation changes, this will bias against our finding a significant relation
between the return events and recommendation changes.
14To determine whether an analyst’s firm had an investment banking relationship with the firm
for which he supplied a recommendation, we matched firms on CUSIP common to the IBES and
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) datasets. We assume an investment banking relationship exists if
the SDC dataset indicates there were any debt or equity offerings or merger and acquisition activity
sponsored by the analyst’s firm any time during the IBES sample period.
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number of analysts following the firm. Other variables that might capture the
amount of publicly available information on the firm include MVE and AGE. Fi-
nally, we include, PRICE, the firm’s stock price on the event day, as an additional
control. This variable is typically considered as a proxy for liquidity, and hence
may control for the incentive to collect (and profit from) private information about
a firm.
We estimate equation (3) by pooling observations across i = 1, . . . , I firms
and j = 1, . . . , J analysts during the±20 day window surrounding the large stock
return event. In addition, as noted above, we estimate equation (3) separately
for each initial recommendation level. In our discussion below, we refer to the
initial or starting recommendation level as LREC, to distinguish it from the ending
recommendation level, REC.
D. Data
Table 4, Panels A and B, presents sample summary statistics for all variables
used in the probit analysis. The mean firm in our sample is 16 years old, has a
price of $36, and has approximately $7.1 billion of equity outstanding. 15 On aver-
age, sample firms are not affiliated with the analyst making the recommendation,
with only 3% of sample firms having an affiliation with the brokerage houses em-
ploying the analyst in our sample. On average, nine analysts cover each firm in
our sample, and in the last three (10) days, 1% (5%) of other analysts covering
the firm have changed their recommendation levels. The mean recommendation
changes (across all analysts covering the firm) in the three- and 10-day periods
prior to each analyst’s recommendation change, LMNREC3 and LMNREC10, are
both near zero, reflecting the fact that analysts rarely change recommendations.
Panel B, which presents summary statistics for the return variables based
on the sign of the three-day return event, indicates the mean standardized three-
day return preceding a recommendation change, ADJRET3, is similar in abso-
lute magnitude for both negative and positive return subsamples,−0.93 and 1.01,
respectively. The mean standardized 10-day return preceding that three-day re-
turn, ADJRET10, indicates there is modest evidence of price reversals for the
positive return events, −0.11, and a virtually flat price movement for negative
return events, −0.02. Since these two return measures share a common price
(i.e., the ending price used to calculate ADJRET10 is also the beginning price for
ADJRET3), this effect may be attributable to bid-ask bounce (see, e.g., Blume and
Stambaugh (1983)).
V. Probit Results
Table 5 presents the ordered probit summary statistics for equation (3). Panel
A reports the findings for the overall sample; Panel B reports the coefficients
on the three-day returns variables for each of the initial recommendation levels.
Panel A reports mean coefficient estimates from five probit regressions corre-
sponding to the initial recommendation levels, along with significance tests based
15Median (Q1) NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ decile rankings for sample firms is 8 (6) indicating that
the sample is primarily composed of large, well-established firms.
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TABLE 4
Probit Sample Summary Statistics
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev.
ADJRET3 −0.03 −0.08 1.37
ADJRET10 −0.06 −0.12 1.45
AFFIL 0.03 0.00 15.72
LMNREC3 0.00 0.00 0.08
LMNREC10 0.01 0.00 0.15
NUMREC 9.48 8.00 7.05
LPERC3 0.01 0.00 0.07
LPERC10 0.05 0.00 0.13
AGE 16.04 12.00 12.23
MVE (000) 7,065,174 1,322,184 19,610,511
PRICE 35.84 28.00 361.90
Panel B. Average Returns by Return Sign
Return Sign Variable Mean Median
Negative ADJRET3 −0.93 −0.69
Negative ADJRET10 −0.02 −0.09
Positive ADJRET3 1.01 0.71
Positive ADJRET10 −0.11 −0.14
In Table 4, the Probit Sample represents recommendation changes following three-day standardized returns within the
±20 days surrounding observations in the 1% return tails of the distribution for sample firms. Panel A presents mean,
median, and standard deviations of variables utilized in the ordered probit estimation presented in Table 5. Panel B
documents descriptive statistics for our return variables, ADJRET3 and ADJRET10, based on the sign of ADJRET3.
upon the summation of individual χ2 statistics.16 Because upgrades (downgrades)
are not possible when the initial recommendation is one or five (i.e., LREC1 or
LREC5), we also report average coefficients for only interior initial recommenda-
tions (i.e., LREC2, LREC3, and LREC4) in the last two columns of Table 5.
Turning to the key variable of interest, ADJRET3, the findings in Table 5
indicate that analysts respond to large price shocks, rejecting the H1 prediction
that because analysts do not believe that they have private information, they will
not respond to public information. That is, in addition to the evidence in Table
2, which suggests that analysts respond more frequently following large return
events, the evidence in Table 5 implies that analysts respond systematically to
both positive and negative return events—analysts are not simply offsetting each
other’s recommendation changes. In particular, the coefficient on positive three-
day return events, ADJRET3, 0.012, is significant, indicating that analysts tend
to downgrade following a large positive return event. In contrast to the effect
of positive return events, the total coefficient on negative three-day return events
(ADJRET3+ADJRET3∗NEGRET),−0.078, is significant and substantially larger
in magnitude than the effect of positive return events. That is, the findings indi-
cate that analysts systematically respond much more strongly to large negative
price shocks. This asymmetry in the analyst response to large price shocks is ev-
idence supportive of the H3 prediction that analysts believe that they possess pri-
vate information but their recommendations are “sticky” downward. In addition,
these results hold even after removing consideration of the extreme recommenda-
tion levels, LREC1 and LREC5; the total coefficient on negative three-day return
events (ADJRET3 + ADJRET3 ∗ NEGRET), −0.046, is significant and substan-
16All parameter estimates and significance tests are weighted by the number of observations corre-
sponding to each lagged recommendation level (LREC). Throughout the paper, we use a 5% criterion
for assessing statistical significance.
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tially larger in magnitude than the effect of positive return events, −0.017. We
examine the economic significance of these results in Table 6.
TABLE 5
Ordered Probit Analysis of the Likelihood of Recommendation Change
Panel A. Coefficient Summaries
All Interior
Recommendations Recommendations
Variable Coefficient z-Stat. Coefficient z-Stat.
NEGRET 0.011 1.18 0.012 1.27
ADJRET3 0.012 4.03 −0.017 −5.00
NEGRET ∗ ADJRET3 −0.090 −22.44 −0.029 −8.45
ADJRET10 −0.004 −1.90 −0.003 −1.35
AFFIL −0.060 −3.23 −0.034 −2.25
AFFIL ∗ ADJRET3 −0.005 −0.40 0.003 0.32
AFFIL ∗ ADJRET10 0.008 0.66 0.006 0.54
LMNREC3 0.325 9.82 0.346 10.27
LMNREC10 0.133 6.93 0.112 5.69
NUMREC 0.001 1.43 0.001 1.64
LPERC3 0.013 1.36 −0.096 −1.90
LPERC10 0.079 4.99 0.025 1.96
AGE 0.002 6.04 0.002 8.61
MVE 0.000 −2.21 0.000 −4.37
PRICE −0.001 −4.00 0.000 −0.49
SMALL 0.054 2.91 0.068 3.80
SMALL∗ADJRET3 −0.018 −1.94 −0.016 −1.46
ADJRET3 + NEGRET ∗ ADJRET3 −0.078 −28.28 −0.046 −16.18
Panel B. Return Coefficients by Lagged Recommendation Level
Lagged Recommendation Level
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
ADJRET3 0.087 0.031 −0.074 −0.027 −0.127
(25.91) (9.25) (−22.10) (−3.67) (−10.25)
ADJRET3 + NEGRET ∗ ADJRET3 −0.159 −0.108 0.027 0.025 0.078
(−57.93) (−35.13) (5.81) (1.45) (5.15)
No. of obs. 2,662,387 3,361,314 2,810,472 109,960 106,427
Table 5 presents the results of the Ordered Probit regression of recommendation levels following three-day standardized
returns within the±20 days surrounding returns in the 1% Sample defined in Table 1. We estimate five separate regres-
sions corresponding to each lagged recommendation level and then calculate weighted average coefficient and z-statistic
estimates utilizing the number of observations in each regression as the weights. The All Recommendations columns utilize
all lagged recommendation levels to derive coefficient and significance estimates, whereas the Interior Recommendations
columns only utilize lagged recommendation levels 2, 3, and 4. Reported results all correspond to the probability of being
in the worse recommendation categories (i.e., strong sell, sell, and hold). z-statistics are in parentheses.
The findings in Panel B of Table 5 indicate that the asymmetry for the three-
day returns variables is largely driven by the observations relating to LREC1 and
LREC2, which comprise two-thirds of the sample. Specifically, the total coef-
ficients on negative three-day return events (ADJRET3 + ADJRET3 ∗ NEGRET)
for LREC1 and LREC2, −0.159 and −0.108, are significant and substantially
larger in magnitude than the effect of positive return events, 0.087 and 0.031. For
the remaining third of the sample, the coefficients on positive return events are
negative, and the coefficients on negative return events are positive, indicating a
propensity to upgrade in all cases. However, the differences in the magnitude are
substantially smaller than for LREC1 and LREC2.
Table 5 also reveals that the coefficient on AFIL is generally negative and
statistically significant, for the full sample and the subsample of interior recom-
mendation levels. The negative sign suggests that the probability of moving to a
lower (and therefore better) recommendation level is greater if there is a historical
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investment banking relationship between the brokerage firm making the recom-
mendation and the firm for which the recommendation is issued. The coefficient
on market capitalization, MVE, is negative, suggesting that analysts give better
recommendations to larger firms. For the smallest firms in the sample, this ten-
dency is exacerbated: the coefficient on SMALL is positive and significant in both
samples, indicating that analysts have a tendency to give even lower recommen-
dations to the firms in the smallest market value decile. Table 5 also indicates
that the coefficients on LMNREC3 and LMNREC10 are positive and significant.
This is consistent with the probability of an upgrade (downgrade) being higher if
other analysts following the same firm upgraded (downgraded) the stock in the
prior three- and 10-day periods. This finding also provides some added support
for the notion of herding among analysts studied by Welch (2000), among others.
Related to this, we see some evidence in the full sample that the recommendation
level of an individual analyst is affected by the proportion of other analysts who
change their recommendation. In particular, the coefficient on LPERC10 is sig-
nificantly positive, indicating a greater propensity to downgrade if other analysts
have changed their recommendation on the stock. Looking at interior recommen-
dation levels only, the coefficient on LPERC10 remains positive and marginally
significant.
TABLE 6
Probit Sample Large Return Transition Matrix
New Recommendation
Panel A. Negative Returns
LREC 1 2 3 4 5
1 98.98% 0.50% 0.49% 0.01% 0.02%
2 0.09% 99.41% 0.49% 0.01% 0.01%
3 0.13% 0.23% 99.60% 0.02% 0.03%
4 0.04% 0.12% 0.50% 99.30% 0.03%
5 0.15% 0.10% 0.72% 0.05% 99.00%
Avg. recommendation change 0.005
Panel B. Positive Returns
LREC 1 2 3 4 5
1 99.33% 0.34% 0.31% 0.01% 0.01%
2 0.16% 99.55% 0.29% 0.01% 0.00%
3 0.23% 0.38% 99.38% 0.01% 0.01%
4 0.06% 0.17% 0.67% 99.08% 0.02%
5 0.25% 0.16% 1.07% 0.07% 98.46%
Avg. recommendation change 0.000
Table 6 provides transition matrices derived from the coefficients presented in Table 5 holding all continuous (indicator)
variables at their means (0) and setting the three-day adjusted return variables equal to their 1% cutoff points (i.e.,−2.59
and 3.06 for the negative and positive return subsamples, respectively). Average Recommendation changes are cal-
culated by multiplying the indicated probability by the corresponding recommendation change and summing across all
possible recommendation change categories where upgrades (downgrades) are recorded as negative (positive) num-
bers. The changes are weighted by the total number of observations in their corresponding LREC level relative to the total
number of observations for the respective sample. LREC is the recommendation level on the day prior to the recommen-
dation change (i.e., the lagged recommendation) where 1 represents strong buy and 5 represents strong sell.
To assess the economic significance of the probit results on the ADJRET3
coefficients, we calculate transition matrices utilizing the probit model specifi-
cation in Table 5 holding all continuous (indicator) variables at their means (0)
and setting the three-day adjusted return variables equal to their 1% cutoff points
(i.e., −2.59 and 3.06 for the negative and positive return subsamples, respec-
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tively). As in Table 3, average recommendation changes are calculated by mul-
tiplying the indicated probability by the corresponding recommendation change
and summing across all possible recommendation change categories where up-
grades (downgrades) are recorded as negative (positive) numbers. The results,
which are presented in Table 6, also indicate that the effect of a negative return
event is economically significant—that is, conditional on a negative return event,
the expected daily recommendation change is 0.005. This is in marked contrast
to the evidence for positive returns events—in particular, the conditional expected
daily recommendation change in Panel B of Table 6 of 0.000. 17 Thus, using the
probit model to control for the effects of other factors in addition to the three-day
return yields the same inferences regarding asymmetry for negative and positive
return events as seen in the unconditional results in Table 3. In addition, Table 6
confirms the inferences drawn from the estimated coefficients in the probit anal-
ysis: analysts tend to downgrade following a negative return event, while there is
no apparent incremental response to a positive return event.
VI. Discussion of Results
The most striking result to emerge from the probit analysis is the asymmetry
between the results for positive and negative returns. For the positive return sam-
ple, we see a relatively small positive coefficient on positive price shocks in the
full sample, and this coefficient changes sign in the subsample of interior recom-
mendation levels. In terms of economic significance, we see very little change in
the expected recommendation level when we condition on a positive return shock.
These results suggest that, conditional on a positive return event, analysts react as
if prices and fundamental values move in concert—the average investment rating
of the companies is largely unchanged. More specifically, following large posi-
tive returns, the probability of upgrades and downgrades in Table 6 is about equal.
Following price increases, analysts do not simply follow up with upgrades, as they
would if they consistently believed the market underreacts, nor do they behave as
if the market systematically overreacts. This finding is potentially consistent with
any of the three hypotheses.
The picture for large negative changes is markedly different. The expected
recommendation change following large stock price drops is a downgrade. In
addition, the z-statistics for coefficients of ADJRET3 are large for the sample in
general, large for the interior recommendation levels, and are even more signif-
icant for small firms. This asymmetry is inconsistent with both of the first two
hypotheses. Furthermore, if recommendations are interpreted as comparisons of
fundamental value with price, these results appear to imply that analysts believe
that the market underreacts on average to bad news, but not good news.
17The average daily recommendation change of 0.005 following large negative return events im-
plies that on average, one out of 200 analysts will downgrade one recommendation level on a daily
basis. It is also similar in magnitude to that associated with a subsample of observations relating to
earnings announcements (see Section VII.B). In particular, we estimated the ordered probits permit-
ting the coefficients on ADJRET3 and ADJRET3 ∗ NEGRET to differ based on whether any day in
the three-day return window was within ±1 day of an earnings announcement. Untabulated findings
indicate that none of the incremental earnings-related coefficients differs significantly from zero.
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In Section VII, we test whether prices in this sample behave in a manner
consistent with underreaction, and find no evidence of it. Thus, it appears that
forces other than direct price-to-value comparisons have an impact on analyst
recommendations. H3 offers one interpretation that is consistent with the data,
namely that business pressure causes analysts to trade off accuracy and optimism.
Given this pressure, negative stock price movements serve as catalysts that allow
analysts to downgrade their recommendations without necessarily eliminating the
optimistic bias.
Note that our results are also consistent with the literature on information
cascades. Suppose that analysts are under pressure to rate companies highly and
not to downgrade for fear of insulting potential clients. This effect, furthermore,
may well extend beyond clients with which a particular investment bank is cur-
rently, or has been historically, affiliated; firms may be worried about future in-
vestment banking business, or access to management (in a pre-Reg FD period)
to provide information with which to form estimates of private value. Given this
pressure, analysts need unambiguous external cues (with which management of
potential clients cannot quarrel) to help them cut ratings. According to this inter-
pretation, analysts recognize that their recommendations are too optimistic. The
arrival of bad news makes it possible to downgrade the company without fear of
retribution. This interpretation is consistent with predicted behavior in models ex-
amining informational cascades (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)),
as well as the evidence in Welch (2000) that suggests that consensus herding is
more prevalent in up-markets. It is also consistent with the empirical evidence
presented in Lin, McNichols, and O’Brien (2004), who find that analysts take
longer to downgrade versus upgrade in a duration analysis framework. It is im-
portant to note that the return event cue is important even after controlling for the
effect of other analysts’ recommendation changes, suggesting that the cue is the
primary motivating force behind the recommendation change rather than herding
behavior.
VII. Additional Tests
A. Post-Event Returns
The asymmetrical analyst response to large negative and positive return events
does not rule out the possibility that analysts believe that they possess superior
information. If analysts do believe that they have private information and their
recommendations reflect it, then stock prices should adjust accordingly—on an-
nouncement of the recommendation change if markets are efficient, and in fu-
ture periods if markets react to this information with a lag. We are particularly
interested in determining whether analysts exhibit differential ability to predict
future returns after downgrading following large negative news relative to other
news/recommendation change combinations.
Table 7 presents unscaled mean and median equally weighted buy-and-hold
market-adjusted returns following the 40,458 and 41,481 large negative and pos-
itive events. Returns are presented separately for recommendation changes of +1
and −1, changes greater than (less than) or equal to 2 (−2), and for no changes
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and affirmations, and over two different horizons, 20 days, and 60 days. Returns
are computed as buy-and-hold returns on the day following the observed recom-
mendation changes, as opposed to Womack (1996) who investigates the contem-
poraneous relation between returns and recommendation changes. 18 Table 7 also
presents tests of differences of mean and median returns following negative and
positive return events for the same analyst response category.
TABLE 7
Future Market-Adjusted Returns Following Recommendation Changes (1% Sample)
Post 3 Days Post 20 Days Post 60 Days
Rec Return
Change Sign OBS Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Down≤−2 Negative 594 0.1% −0.5%* −0.2% −2.1%** −3.0%** −3.9%**
Positive 208 −0.5% −0.5%* −2.7%** −2.1%** −5.6%** −5.4%**
Difference 0.6% 0.0% 2.5%** 0.0% 2.7% 1.5%
Down−1 Negative 1,288 0.1% −0.5%* −1.3%** −2.2%** −3.3%** −3.9%**
Positive 359 −0.9%** −1.0%** −1.0% −1.7%** 0.2% −2.3%**
Difference 1.1%** 0.5% −0.3% −0.5% −3.5%* −1.6%
Up +1 Negative 424 0.4% 0.1% 0.4% −0.1% −2.4%* −2.6%**
Positive 450 −0.1% −0.3% 1.4%* 0.6% 3.1%* 1.5%
Difference 0.5% 0.4% −1.0% 0.7% −5.5%** −4.1%**
Up≥ +2 Negative 122 0.2% −0.3% 0.7% 0.8% 2.3% 0.8%
Positive 162 0.6% 0.8% 1.8% 1.5%* 0.0% −0.6%
Difference −0.4% −1.1% −1.1% −0.7% 2.3% 1.4%
Affirm Negative 229 0.1% −0.4% −1.2% −1.3% −2.5% −3.8%**
Positive 132 −0.2% 0.3% −0.3% −0.6% −1.1% −1.9%
Difference 0.2% −0.7% −0.9% −0.7% −1.5% −1.9%
No change Negative 111,292 0.2%** 0.0%** −0.3%** −0.5%** −1.1%** −1.7%**
Positive 98,824 −0.5%** −0.6%** −0.5%** −0.9%** −0.6%** −2.2%**
Difference 0.7%** 0.6%** 0.2%** 0.4%** −0.5%** 0.5%**
Table 7 presents market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns over the corresponding three-, 20- and 60-day periods beginning
the day after the corresponding recommendation change. The return sign is designated positive (negative) if ADJRET3 is
greater than or equal to (less than) zero. Rec Change represents the corresponding recommendation change that occurs
the day after the large return event ends. The Difference row provides tests of differences between the same categories
across different return signs. *, ** indicate two-tailed t-statistic significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The general picture that emerges is that stock prices drop immediately around
downgrades, and continue to fall in the days following downgrades regardless of
whether the downgrade was preceded by a large positive or negative return event.
For example, Table 7 reveals that median returns for stocks that are downgraded
one category, which comprise more than two-thirds of the downgrades, are sig-
nificantly negative over the 20- and 60-day horizons following both negative and
positive return events.19 Similar findings obtain for stocks that are downgraded
two or more categories. There is no systematic stock price movement following
upgrades preceded by either large positive or negative return events. 20 The tests
for differences in mean returns in Table 7 indicate that, if anything, negative price
18We also examined post-event returns conditioning on the sign of unexpected recommendation
changes computed using fitted values from the probit model. Untabulated findings reveal no observ-
able pattern in post-event returns that cannot be garnered from the tabulated results in Table 7.
19Insignificance in some of the mean returns is likely attributable to positive return skewness. Ex-
tant research (Kothari and Warner (1997)) suggests that skewness is not peculiar to our sample, but is
endemic to buy-and-hold returns.
20One interesting finding is that stock prices appear to fall for “no change” observations preceded
by both large positive and negative return events. One explanation for this is that the market expected
most of these stocks to have been upgraded. That is, the fact that such stocks were not upgraded was
regarded as bad news by the market.
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reactions are stronger following downgrades (−2.7%) preceded by positive re-
turn events than negative return events (−0.2%). That is, we do not find evidence
that the larger propensity for analysts to downgrade following large negative price
shocks is attributable to the analysts’ ability to predict that the prices will continue
to fall.
Taken together, the evidence in Table 7 seems to provide support for the
notion that analyst recommendation changes (more specifically, the downgrades)
following large stock price movements are informative to the market. However,
the future return data fail to account for asymmetrical response of analysts in re-
sponse to large negative and positive stock price events. 21 That is, for our sample
of large stock price events, we find no basis in subsequent returns for the differ-
ences in analysts’ response to a sharp price movement.
B. Earnings Announcement Events
As an additional robustness check, we re-estimated the probit model on a
subsample of earnings announcement events. Specifically, instead of using large
price changes to define our sample, we use the sample of all earnings announce-
ment events for firms in our sample. Our purpose in conducting this test is to
choose a sample of price movements for which we know there is a corresponding
information event. We record all analyst recommendations in the 15 days fol-
lowing each earnings announcement. For the earnings announcement subsample,
58% of recommendation changes occur in the three days immediately following
the earnings announcement.
In this probit analysis we control for the sign and magnitude of the earnings
surprise measured for each individual analyst. We also interact the extent of the
earnings surprise with the related price response. Untabulated results indicate that
analysts are still more likely to downgrade following a large negative stock price
shock. That is, controlling for the sign and magnitude of the earnings surprise has
no effect on inferences from our main findings reported in Tables 5 and 6. 22
VIII. Conclusion
This study examines how analysts respond to public information when set-
ting their stock recommendations. Specifically, we empirically test different hy-
potheses regarding analyst information and incentives using a sample of stocks
that experience large stock price movements, and analyst recommendation changes
for those stocks. Using an ordered probit model based on all available IBES stock
21Untabulated findings from additional analyses provide some evidence that controlling for analyst
activity during future return event horizons accounts for part of the returns following the recommen-
dation change events.
22As another robustness check, we re-estimated the probit model for a subsample of large return
events for which we could find no public information release (see footnote 9 for a description of this
subsample). In this subsample, it is less likely that fundamental value, and hence analysts’ fundamen-
tal valuation, changes. In this subsample of 500 large return events, there were 97 large stock price
movements for which we could find no related public release of news. For these 97 events, there were
five (12) analysts who changed their recommendation in the five (10) days following the large return
event. The results from this estimation are similar to those reported in the paper, and suggest that it is
the return event and not just the public news that causes the asymmetry in analysts’ response.
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recommendations from 1993 to 1999, we find evidence of an asymmetry between
the results for positive and negative returns, even after controlling for the ini-
tial recommendation level. Following large positive returns, the probability of
upgrades and downgrades is about equal. In contrast, following large negative
returns, analysts are much more likely to downgrade than upgrade the company’s
stock.
Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts believe that they
have private information, and set recommendations comparing private values to
market price. That is, they respond to public information events using large price
shocks as a proxy for news. However, the asymmetrical response is further con-
sistent with a dynamic component to the analyst’s optimism when setting rec-
ommendations. The results suggest stickiness in recommendations induced by
reluctance to downgrade, possibly because of conflicts of interest or information
cascades.
Relatedly, there is also evidence that upgrades are more likely if there is an
investment banking relationship between the brokerage firm making the recom-
mendation and the firm for which the recommendation is issued. In addition,
there is evidence that analysts tend to respond in the same direction as other ana-
lysts who recently changed their recommendations, which adds some support for
the notion of herding among analysts. This finding obtains for the full sample of
recommendations, and (as a control for the censored nature of the recommenda-
tion levels, and changes in levels) for a subsample that includes only “interior”
recommendation levels of 2, 3, or 4.
Findings from analysis of future stock returns indicate that analysts’ rec-
ommendation changes are useful in explaining future stock returns. However, the
findings fail to provide an explanation for the observed asymmetry in the response
of analysts following large negative and positive return events. Specifically, we
find no evidence that the market consistently under- or over-reacts to public in-
formation. We also examine a subset of recommendations following large stock
price movements that are associated with earnings announcements and find the
asymmetry is present in this subsample. That is, after controlling for earnings sur-
prises, downgrades are more likely to follow negative price shocks, but upgrades
and downgrades are equally likely to follow positive price shocks. Overall, our
findings suggest that the bias in recommendations changes through time, and that
the bias may decrease conditional on a significant public information shock.
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